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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

INTRODUCTION

JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN*
Brown v. Board of Education1 is the seminal case of the Twentieth
Century. Mere mention of the case can start discussion on any number of
topics, all important and all that relate to, or were importantly affected by,
Brown. Some of those discussions relate to the immediate subject of Brown:
Was state-imposed racially segregated public education a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause? What is the nature of race relations in America?
How close are we to achieving a racially just society? How fair is our system
of public education? Others might focus on Brown for its impact on
institutions of government: What does Brown suggest about the nature of law
and the judicial role? What role did Brown have in the proliferation of
constitutional rights claimed since then? And what impact did it have on the
relative roles and behavior of national and state government and of different
institutions of the federal government? Finally, Brown suggests a range of
historical questions, regarding the origins and nature of segregation and
discrimination, the factors that produced the decision, and its impact, both
immediate and over a longer period.
These are only a few of the rich body of topics that Brown invites, but
more than enough to suggest that the fiftieth anniversary of Brown is an
appropriate occasion to focus again on that historic case. On October 10,
2003, Saint Louis University School of Law held a day-long conference on
Brown in anticipation of its fiftieth anniversary on May 17, 2004. The articles
and essays published in this volume grew out of that event.
The conference was held as an expanded version of our annual Richard J.
Childress Memorial Lecture. Named for a former dean of our law school,2 the
Childress Lecture has become the high point of the academic year since 2000.

* Associate Dean of Faculty and Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. The Childress Lecture was named for Richard J. Childress, dean of our law school from
1969 to 1976. The lecture commemorates the numerous contributions he made to the School of
Law. He was a member of the faculty at the School of Law for almost thirty years, and served for
fifteen years as associate dean and dean. In addition to his strong commitment to the School of
Law, Dean Childress was dedicated to legal service, holding memberships in the American Law
Institute and the Missouri Bar Committee on the Bill of Rights. He was a respected professor
who was well-known for his broad and visionary approach to teaching constitutional law.
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Each year since then, an eminent legal scholar has delivered a lecture on a
pressing topic in law and has published a major article in the Saint Louis
University Law Journal.3 A volume of the Law Journal is dedicated to
publishing the lecture and articles, comments, and essays that accompany it on
related topics.
This year’s Childress Lecturer, William E. Nelson, continues that tradition.
The Judge Edward Weinfeld Professor of Law at New York University School
of Law, Professor Nelson is one of our nation’s foremost legal historians. A
prolific scholar, Professor Nelson’s books include The Fourteenth Amendment:
From Political Principle to Judicial Doctrine,4 Marbury v. Madison: The
Origins and Legacy of Judicial Review,5 and The Legalist Reformation: Law,
Politics, and Ideology in New York, 1920–1980.6 Professor Nelson has
managed to produce a large corpus of high-quality scholarship even while
being heavily engaged in the life of his law school for nearly a quarter-century
and while finding time to mentor and encourage dozens of young academics.
His scholarship and contributions to legal education make him a model for
others.
Professor Nelson has focused his lecture and Article on addressing a shift
in the jurisprudence of legal realism that he connects to Brown. Professor
Nelson’s argument is rich and nuanced and cannot be adequately reduced to a
single paragraph. In essence, he argues that Brown played a role in
transforming the way in which law is conceived. Although legal realists have
dominated the jurisprudential landscape of the country since the 1930s, legal
realism has evolved and changed during that time. Before Brown, legal
thinkers viewed judges as agents of society who made law conform to the
wishes of society. After Brown, however, legal thinkers shifted their emphasis
to view law as a force that determines the ultimate direction society takes.
The three commentators are uniquely positioned to discuss Professor
Nelson’s provocative claim. Judge Louis Pollak, former dean of Yale and
University of Pennsylvania Law School, was, of course, the author of Racial
Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler,7 one of
the responses to Herbert Wechsler’s controversial article8 that questioned the

3. See Jerold H. Israel, Free Standing Due Process and Criminal Procedure: The Supreme
Court’s Search for Interpretive Guidelines, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 303 (2001); Harold Hongju Koh,
A United States Human Rights Policy for the 21st Century, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 293 (2002);
Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 569 (2003).
4. (1998).
5. (2000).
6. (2001).
7. 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1959).
8. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HAR. L. REV. 1
(1959).
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rationale behind the Brown decision. Judge Pollak is joined by two authors of
recent books dealing with Brown, Robert J. Cottrol, the Harold Paul Green
Research Professor of Law at George Washington University Law School,9
and Mary L. Dudziak, the Judge Edward J. and Ruey L. Guirado Professor of
Law and History at University of Southern California School of Law.10
Professor Jack Greenberg of Columbia, the long-time Director and Counsel of
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)
Legal Defense and Education Fund, discusses insights on the role of Brown in
American history from his recent experience in Budapest integrating Roma
children into public schools.
The Supreme Court’s recent decisions in the Michigan affirmative action
cases11 produce some opportunity to consider Brown’s legacy in at least one
aspect of education. Dean Evan Caminker of the University of Michigan
School of Law was among those who directed the Law School’s defense in
Grutter v. Bollinger.12 He offers insights regarding the litigation strategy that
helped shape the outcome of that case. Professor William LaPiana, the Rita
and Joseph Solomon Professor of Wills, Trusts and Estates at New York Law
School, has been engaged in a lengthy study of the LSAT. His Article presents
insights into that instrument as a tool for admissions decisions. My Article
argues that Grutter went well beyond the Court’s 1978 decision in Regents of
University of California v. Bakke13 by expanding the parameters of the student
diversity rationale underlying race-conscious admissions.
Finally, three leading young historians have contributed separate Articles
from their larger studies that consider various aspects of the aftermath of
Brown. Professor Kevin Kruse of Princeton University’s Department of
History focuses on the ways in which segregationists at the state level worked
to thwart the implementation of Brown. Focusing on Georgia, he demonstrates
how the strategies its leaders pursued eroded, rather than supported, the old
racial caste system. Professor Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Associate Professor at
Washington University School of Law, considers the ambivalence of AfricanAmericans in Atlanta towards Brown and the impact of social dynamics in the
black community on the implementation of Brown. Professor Anders Walker
of the John Jay College of Criminal Justice examines the intersection between
the southern judiciary and Brown to demonstrate the ways in which the
decision catalyzed innovations in political and judicial technology.

9. See ROBERT J. COTTROL, RAYMOND T. DIAMOND & LELAND B. WARE, BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION: CASTE, CULTURE AND THE CONSTITUTION (2003).
10. See MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2000).
11. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003).
12. 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
13. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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Brownand the questions it raises richly deserve our attention. It is
accordingly appropriate that so many institutions are devoting some time this
year to studying that decision. We believe this volume makes an important
contribution to education about some of the issues Brown raises.

